

# **Overview of Incentive Auction Issues**

December 13, 2013

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### Support for 35x35 MHz "Down from 51" Plan

#### **T-Mobile / Verizon Joint Band Plan\***



#### AT&T\*



<sup>\*</sup> AT&T has endorsed the T-Mobile / Verizon Joint Band Plan for clearing scenarios 84 MHz and above.

#### **Sprint**




### Support for 35x35 MHz "Down from 51" Plan



35x35 MHz Plan Accommodates Variations


#### T-Mobile / Verizon Joint Band Plan





#### Low-band Spectrum is Highly Concentrated

## Spectrum holdings below 1 GHz (population-weighted average megahertz)



Source: Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Mobile Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, WT Docket No. 11-186, ¶ 118 (rel. Mar. 21, 2013).


- The nation's two largest wireless carriers control vast amounts of "beachfront" spectrum below 1 GHz while largely avoiding competitive scrutiny
- Verizon and AT&T hold 86% of the below 1 GHz spectrum in the top 10 U.S. markets and more than 80% in the top 50 markets.

Source: Sprint Nextel Comments, WT Docket No. 12-269 (filed Nov. 28, 2012) at 5-6.



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### Low-Band Spectrum Necessary to Compete



- AT&T's CEO: Low-band spectrum is "beachfront property" and "propagates like a bandit"
- Verizon's CFO: Low-band spectrum has "very high" propagation into buildings

In-building penetration and rural coverage is essential to compete

Lowell McAdam, President & CEO, Verizon Wireless, Presentation to Barclays Capital (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.verizon.com/idc/groups/public/documents/adacct/event 965 precol.pdf#page=8

- A one-third limit on below 1 GHz holdings addresses market power
  - Minimum access exception ensures a 5x5 MHz license is available in all markets
  - AT&T could win two or more licenses in >70% of markets at 84 MHz.
- To protect competition and consumers, the Administration through the DOJ supports below 1 GHz spectrum-aggregation limits
- Dynamic Market Rule ensures clearing targets and revenue are never at risk

# Anticipated Funding for FirstNet Met Before Incentive Auction




Spectrum Block	Estimated Proceeds (4Q2013)	Price per MHz-POP (Est.)
H Block 1915-1920 MHz/1995-2000 MHz	\$1.6-\$2.3 billion	\$0.50-\$0.75
<i>AWS-3</i> [1755-1780] <sup>1</sup> /2155-2180 MHz	\$6.3-\$9.4 billion	\$0.80-\$1.20
1695 Band 1695-1710/[unspecified 15 MHz in the Spectrum Act]	≥\$1 billion unpaired; \$2.3-\$4.7 billion paired	≥\$0.21 if unpaired; \$0.50-\$1.00 if paired
Total (without 600 MHz)	\$8.9-\$16.4 billion	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Proceeds from the auction of this spectrum band do not go to the Public Safety Trust Fund and so are excluded from these calculations


### Different License Sizes Proposed




#### 176 Economic Areas (EAs) ...




...350 Partial Economic Areas (PEAs)...



... 734 Cellular Market Areas (CMAs)...



...or 176 EAs followed by 429 RSAs



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## Package Bidding Poses Serious Challenges

- A package bidder's withdrawal creates excess supply, price uncertainty, questions of bidding eligibility, and other problems peculiar to the incentive auction context.
- Package bidding creates damaging opportunities for strategic bidding.
- Package bidding is not necessary if reasonable spectrumaggregation limits are adopted because limits reduce bidders' exposure risk.

### Three Steps to Ensure Interoperability

- Require interoperability of all 600 MHz licensees
- Design band plan to permit deployment with a single band class
- Assign licenses randomly or quasi-randomly to create durable incentives for interoperability

### Scoring Helps Clear Spectrum

- The FCC should start reverse auction prices at different levels for stations that have different values.
- The goal of scoring is <u>not</u> to name the right price for any station, but rather to ensure the <u>starting</u> price better reflects the relative value of a station.
- Scoring will increase the amount of spectrum made available for broadband, accelerate the auction process and result in more revenue for the U.S. Treasury.
- Scoring can help broadcasters by more effectively distributing funds in the reverse auction.